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24-Aug-2005
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Financing the Greater Mekong Subregion

The countries of the Subregion will have to rely increasingly on private sector participation in the financing and provision of infrastructure-related services. George
Abonyi analyses the issue


     HE concept of a "Greater Mekong Subregion" (GMS) -- encompassing
the 230 million people of Cambodia, the Chinese province of Yunnan, Laos,
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam -- did not exist until very recently. Although the Mekong Committee was established in 1957 as a United Nations initiative, it was limited in scope, focusing on the Mekong River, and excluded Burma (now Myanmar) and China. In the prevailing and subsequent political climate, economic interaction among the countries of the subregion remained limited.

Recent political and economic developments have created an environment in the GMS conducive to subregional economic co-operation. The remarkable economic performance and increasing integration of South-east and East Asia has expanded the scope for co-operation. Within the GMS, conflict has given way to peace, and former centrally-planned economies are at various stages of transition to more open and market-based systems, spurred in part by the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc and the resulting need to find new trading and investment partners. Interest in greater
economic co-operation among the GMS countries has emerged as a practical response to international competitive pressures and opportunities, and to evolving
domestic priorities.

With technical assistance and co-ordinating support from the Asian Development Bank, the six GMS countries entered into an extensive programme of subregional
economic co-operation in 1992. Guided by the pragmatism of enlightened self-interest, the countries have focused on creating specific linkages of complementary economic activities across borders. The purpose is to support the development process beyond the limits of national boundaries, and to enhance the investment attractiveness of the GMS countries as a group. Co-operation in the GMS reflects a recognition that
the economic potential of the subregional whole can be greater than the sum of the individual national parts.

Given the modest level of development of most of the participating countries, the GMS programme has emphasised concrete projects in common priority areas, in order to
build and sustain the momentum of co-operation. Supported by the ADB's technical assistance, close to 100 subregional projects and initiatives have been endorsed by the GMS governments at the senior Ministerial level, in seven sectors: transportation, energy, telecommunications, environment, human resource development, trade and investment, and tourism.

Well-defined projects of joint-priority interest allow the GMS governments to experiment with subregional co-operation in a tangible way, with clear expected
benefits, but limiting their overall risk. At the same time, projects can also be used to address broader issues in economic cooperation. For example, road projects can be (and indeed are being) used to address fundamental "software" issues relating to non-physical barriers restricting the movement of goods and people across borders such as transit, customs and pricing policies and regulations. In this way, the GMS
co-operation process is building the foundations and confidence for
expanding subregional cooperation beyond individual projects and sectors.

To ensure effective project implemen tation and sustain regional co-operation, the GMS countries have established a flexible co-ordinating framework as part of the
ADB-facilitated programme. Senior officials' forums and working groups oversee project
implementation in specific sectors, and a steering group composed of senior ministers provides overall policy guidance. The very senior level of participation also signals (particularly to potential investors) the strong and sustained commitment
of the participating countries to the subregional co-operation process, as well as to specific projects.

The key issue facing economic co-operation in the GMS at this stage is the mobilisation of the extensive resources required for project implementation, especially
for infrastructure-related projects. For example, financing needed for priority subregional transport and telecommunications projects alone is estimated at around US$9 billion. The GMS governments, even supported by official assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors, have neither the finances nor the managerial resources to meet these needs. Reflecting broader trends in Asia, they will have to rely increasingly
on private sector participation in the financing and provision of infrastructure-related services: this is the central challenge of capital mobilisation in the GMS.

Given extensive needs and significant investor interest, a number of innovative financing mechanisms have been put forward for involving the private sector in infrastructure-related projects, e.g. build-operate-transfer (BOT). These provide a wider range of options for both governments and private investors. Utilising these and similar approaches, many privately sponsored projects are at various stages of preparation throughout Asia, including in the GMS.
However, only a small fraction is under implementation, and an even smaller fraction in operation. A number of major infrastructure funds have also been established, but their utilisation also lags behind their promise. Understanding this gap between promise and present reality has important implications for effective capital mobilisation for the GMS.

Innovative financing mechanisms generally involve the application of project finance principles, where expected performance is the key project asset. Project cash flow, or
the revenue generating potential of the project, is the fundamental basis for financing, with investors aiming to achieve full recovery and a reasonable return on their investments.

The perceived benefits of approaches such as BOT for government include: expanding potential borrowing capacity, since it apparently provides "off-budget" financing; off-loading project risks to the private sector; and bringing private sector efficiency and
commercial discipline to the project preparation and implementation process. The price includes generally higher costs, in terms of the returns on both equity and debt financing demanded by investors, as a kind of risk premium; a  usually lengthier project development process; constraints on project sponsors' flexibility; and limits
on the government's ability to change the business environment for the project (e.g., to effect the revenue generating capacity of the project).

The central issue is whether or under what conditions a project will generate a reliable and sustained cash flow. In this context, many infrastructure-related projects in
the GMS are unlikely to be implementable at this time on a "purely commercial" basis because of project economics, or because of non-commercial project risks. Projects characterised by high economic returns, but marginal financial returns, are good for the economy -- but not necessarily attractive to private investors. As a consequence, they are likely to require public/private cooperation in some form, including support
from host governments and/or multilateral institutions.

This is not unique to the GMS. To assure investors a reliable cash flow, governments often shoulder certain project risks (e.g., performance guarantees, offtake
agreements); use national resources to offset private risk (e.g., real estate or resource concessions); or introduce (or relax) legislative measures to facilitate project completion or operations. These are, in effect, forms of public/private sector cooperation, with an associated distribution of benefits and costs, obligations and risks to the participants -- government and private investors.

In fact, in most infrastructure-related projects the central issue is the allocation of risk between the government and the private sector. This in turn affects project costs,
and investor returns. If government accepts more of the risk (e.g., through a "minimum
ridership guarantee" for a toll road; "take or pay" agreement for power; real estate concessions for a rapid transit system), the cost -- as the return on equity and debt demanded by the private sector -- may go down. If the private sector
has to take more of the risk, the costs increase. In general, the perception, allocation, and management of risk affects how a project is designed and managed, its
total cost structure, revenue generating capacity -- or whether it will be implemented at all.

Ultimately, it is the fundamental responsibility of governments to ensure that infrastructure-related services serve the public interest: in this way, they must balance
resource mobilisation needs with equity considerations. In each instance, governments must weigh the benefits of private financial participation against the real costs to the economy of the public obligations and commitments likely to be incurred.

GMS projects are further complicated by their subregional nature. If the success of a project is dependent on activities in two or more economies, with different
political and legal jurisdictions, the risks associated with project preparation and implementation may increase. However, the subregional nature of projects may also be used to reduce risk (or increase the potential returns). For example, it may allow for "internalising" and therefore better management of some of the usually external risk factors (e.g., a power or road project in a given country as part of a subregional,
trans-border network); introduction of more stable rules of the game (e.g., third country language and a governing law which is more acceptable to investors than those
of the participating countries); and reducing the risk profile of particular "high risk" countries through a kind of subregional "pooling" of country risks for specific projects.

The challenge of resource mobilisation for the GMS involves (to a large extent) addressing the issue of risk management within an explicitly subregional context,
especially to help bring about stable public/private partnerships in subregional projects. Negotiating clearly understood, mutually acceptable, and enduring agreements between government and private investors on the allocation of risks and obligations is a key to the successful implementation of infrastructure-related projects in the GMS. This will greatly facilitate private capital mobilisation for subregional projects.

Given these complexities, multilateral institutions such as the ADB, can play a key role in resource mobilisation, beyond that of traditional lenders. They can assist in
the preparation of "bankable" subregional projects that reflect both public policy and commercial considerations; use their financing increasingly as a catalyst to leverage private resources to meet the specific needs of subregional projects, giving a level of comfort to both participating governments and private investors; use guarantees to cover "policy risk" arising from government actions (especially as related to
subregional projects), thereby stimulating private resource flows; and build on their impartiality and technical competence to play a dispute resolution role between
governments and private investors in a subregional context.

A further key role for multilateral institutions such as the ADB, involves assisting GMS governments in formulating effective policies and procedures for facilitating
private investment in infrastructure-related projects. This is essential to the successful
implementation of subregional projects since it is governments that set the rules of the game for the private sector: defining legal, regulatory, and policy frameworks, including trans-border agreements.

The result can be a convergence of government policies and programmes, and private sector capital and technical expertise, with the experience and facilitating role of
multilateral institutions, to provide an effective framework for resources mobilisation for GMS projects.


Dr George Abonyi is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and a Senior Advisor at the Asian Development Bank.
 

   
   
   

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